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SUMMARY
The Investment Canada Act (ICA) needs an overhaul. This reform must 
include a paradigm shift in thinking to a much less restrictive view about 
the benefits of foreign direct investment in Canada. Currently, the ICA 
operates under the presumption that foreign firms behave detrimentally to 
the Canadian economy: foreign acquirers are required to show “net benefit” 
to Canada and may need to make onerous commitments for maintaining 
output or employment. This attitude, a holdover from the ICA’s predecessor, 
the Foreign Investment Review Agency, has created an atmosphere which 
fosters protectionism and relies on economically incoherent factors to assess 
the merit of proposed transactions. It is time to shed that archaic attitude 
and adopt a more reasoned perspective.
Rather than requiring each proposed transaction to provide proof for the 
specific benefit to Canada, the ICA should assume that foreign acquisitions 
benefit Canada unless there is proof to the contrary. A more welcoming, 
balanced and rational perspective would be that foreign acquisitions actually 
improve the productivity of Canadian companies and contribute to the well-
being of Canada’s economy.
The ICA is flawed in other ways, too. Some reviews of proposed transactions 
have become unnecessarily fraught with politics. Think of the recent politically 
enmeshed fretting over the bid that the state-owned Chinese Offshore 
National Company made for Nexen Energy, or Malaysia’s state-owned 
Petronas’ bid for Progress Energy Resources Corp. Indeed, there has been 
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a very real fear of traditionally Canadian-owned institutions losing their Canadian 
essence to foreign ownership. Then, too, there is the federal government’s built-in 
ability to impose onerous conditions, or undertakings, on foreign acquirers. All this is 
clearly a deterrent to potentially beneficial foreign investment in Canada.
Canada needs a new regime without nationalism, protectionism and politics. Ideally, 
this new regime would require decisions based on economically-grounded criteria, 
with the onus placed on the federal government to prove that a given transaction 
would be detrimental to the domestic economy. This would shift the government’s 
role from its current one, in which the minister of innovation, science and economic 
development approves a proposal deemed to be beneficial to Canada, and has broad 
powers to withhold federal approval. This leaves the rejected foreign acquirer with 
no impartial avenue of appeal, such as a specialized tribunal. The reforms to the 
ICA should also include establishing a specialized tribunal where foreign acquirers 
can challenge negative decisions, just as the Competition Act provides a means for 
challenging antitrust aspects of mergers and acquisitions more broadly.
There is extensive empirical evidence demonstrating that foreign investment 
is beneficial to Canada because it results in improvements in productivity and 
competitiveness. As well, foreign-controlled firms in Canada pay higher wages, make 
large investments in R&D, innovation and skilled labour, experience fewer layoffs 
during economic downturns, and impart their technologies to domestic firms, among 
other benefits. Indeed, from 1980 to 1999, 2/3 of Canada’s manufacturing sector 
labour productivity growth came from foreign-controlled companies, even though 
they comprised only 40 per cent of that sector’s employment.
Not only could the Competition Act with its tribunal model serve as a framework for 
these much-needed reforms to the ICA, but, as well, reform of the ICA should similarly 
entrench the promotion of competition, economic efficiency and domestic welfare 
as its core objectives. That translates to not treating foreign investment as an end in 
itself, but as a means to promote economic efficiency through competition in both 
markets for products and corporate control.
1OVERVIEW
Canada’s current regime for reviewing foreign investments under the Investment Canada 
Act (ICA)1 inefficiently shields Canadian companies from acquisition by foreign investors. 
Premised on assumptions that foreign firms act differently than Canadian firms, the current 
factors for assessing the net benefit from a transaction under the ICA are protectionist, 
economically incoherent and inconsistent with the evidence. In contrast with the ICA’s 
current presumption that the benefits to Canada from foreign acquisition of Canadian assets 
need to be proven for each transaction, acquisitions by foreigners presumptively improve 
the productivity of Canadian companies and the overall Canadian economy. 
Moreover, the ICA has been increasingly criticized for its perceived unpredictability and 
opacity. In its current state, certain reviews can become mired in political considerations, 
and the government’s ability to impose undertakings on foreign acquirers creates the risk 
of rent-seeking by politically connected interest groups. To this end, the ICA regime should 
be reformed in order that: 1) proposed transactions would be reviewed on economically 
grounded criteria; 2) the onus would be on the government to show net detriment to 
domestic welfare; and 3) that a negative decision concerning a transaction could be 
challenged by a specialized tribunal (similar to the regime for reviewing mergers under the 
Competition Act).2
Canada’s regime for foreign investment review
Currently, foreign commencement of a business or foreign equity investments that result in 
a change of control of certain Canadian business assets must be reported to the minister of 
innovation, science and economic development. Beyond specified thresholds,3 the particular 
investment is subject to review and approval. Under the ICA, the minister is to review the 
proposed investment and approve the transaction if “satisfied that the investment is likely 
to be of net benefit to Canada.”4 As part of the review process, written undertakings to the 
minister by potential investors are permitted and the ICA provides for remedies against an 
investor who later contravenes an undertaking.5
The ICA sets out potential factors for the minister to consider, including “the level and 
nature of economic activity in Canada,” “the degree and significance of participation by 
Canadians” and “the compatibility of the investment with national industrial, economic 
and cultural policies.”6 The minister thus has a broad and discretionary basis to deny any 
1 
RSC 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.) (ICA)
2 
RSC 1985, c. C-34.
3 
Pursuant to ICA, s. 14.1, as of April 24, 2015, the review threshold is $600 million in enterprise value for investments 
to directly acquire control of a Canadian business by WTO investors that are not state-owned enterprises; and by non-
WTO investors that are not state-owned enterprises where the Canadian business that is the subject of the investment is, 
immediately prior to the implementation of the investment, “controlled by a WTO investor.” This review threshold will 
increase to $800 million in enterprise value in 2017 and $1 billion in enterprise value in 2019, with annual indexation to 
nominal GDP growth after 2021. For acquirers that are state-owned enterprises, the review threshold for 2016 is $375 
million in asset value.
4 
ICA, s. 16 (1).
5 
Ibid., s. 39-40.
6 
Ibid., s. 20.
2proposed transaction. As such, in an albeit dated decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, 
decisions under the ICA have been held not to be subject to judicial review by the federal 
courts, and although current authorities would likely permit judicial review, a court would 
likely take a high level of deference to the minister’s determination, functionally insulating 
the decision from any substantive challenge.7
Criticisms of current ICA regime
In the wake of the rejection or withdrawal of several high-profile transactions and with 
anecdotal reports that undertakings under the ICA have recently intensified (so-called 
“undertaking creep”), concerns have been raised about whether the ICA is economically 
coherent in its approach to evaluating foreign equity investments and, specifically, whether 
it is deterring beneficial foreign investments from Canada.8
Several authors have argued for significant revisions to the ICA, ranging from increased 
transparency around the minister’s decisions to a full reversal of the current onus to instead 
requiring the minister to demonstrate net detriment. Notably, the reversal of the onus was 
also a recommendation of the 2008 Competition Policy Review Panel (CPRP),9 which the 
present federal government has not yet implemented. However, the CPRP notably did not 
spell out any procedural machinery to allow a proponent to challenge the minister’s net 
detriment determination. Other commentators recommend largely cosmetic changes to the 
net benefit test, arguing that a more precise prescription of the factors will provide sufficient 
certainty while preserving allegedly politically desirable flexibility for the minister.10
However, most commentators broadly accept the ICA’s basic structure and, even where 
recommending a reversal of the onus, do not consider the institutional and procedural 
complements to make a net detriment decision justiciable. More fundamentally, most 
scholarship has neglected to question the ICA’s implicit assumptions about supposed 
differences in economic behaviour between foreign and domestic firms. That is, subjecting 
foreign acquirers of Canadian assets – but not domestic acquirers – to the net benefit test 
presupposes that foreign firms may use those assets in a manner that is suboptimal for the 
Canadian economy. This paper argues there is no theoretical or empirical basis for such a 
presumption. 
7 Baril v. Canada (Minister of Regional Industrial Expansion), [1986] 1 FC 328 (CA). This decision was based on an 
earlier version of section 28 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c. F-7 that conferred jurisdiction for judicial review 
only of decisions “required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis.” In Baril at paras. 4-9, the Federal 
Court of Appeal held that the minister’s decision under the ICA was not judicially reviewable since it was not a judicial or 
quasi-judicial decision. Under the current version of section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, decisions of federal boards, 
commissions or other tribunals (as discussed in Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., [2010] 3 SCR 585, 2010 SCC 
62 at para. 3), include ministers among the panoply of federal decision-makers. Nonetheless, the minister’s determination of 
net benefit under the ICA has not been subsequently challenged, and, given the nature of the decision-maker and the breadth 
of the factors prescribed in the ICA, would presumably be subject to a high level of deference on any judicial review.
8 
Susan M. Hutton and Megan MacDonald, “Stocking Canada’s Foreign Investment Review Toolbox: The Future of the 
Investment Canada Act,” Canadian Competition Law Review 24, 2012, 117; Lawrence L. Herman, “Investment Review 
in Canada – We Can Do Better,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 4(10), 2011; and Philippe 
Bergevin and Daniel Schwanen, “Reforming the Investment Canada Act: Walk More Softly, Carry a Bigger Stick,” CD 
Howe Institute Commentary 337, 2011.
9 
Competition Policy Review Panel, Compete to Win: Final Report (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 
2008).
10 
Dany Assaf and Rory McGillis, “Foreign Direct Investment and the National Interest: A Way Forward,” IRPP Study 40, 
April 2013.
3More recently, A. E. Safarian11 and Steven Globerman12 have argued that this asymmetric 
treatment for foreign acquirers is economically harmful for Canadian businesses, 
contending that Canada should not screen foreign investments except on national security 
grounds. Similarly, Matt Krzepkowski and Jack Mintz have outlined the economic 
arguments for the greater openness of the Canadian economy to foreign direct investment.13 
This paper builds on this work by examining the legal structure of Canada’s ICA regime 
and proposing a route for economically coherent legislative reform. Unlike Safarian and 
Globerman, this paper allows that there may be economic grounds for disallowing a foreign 
acquisition where there is a demonstrable theoretical and evidentiary basis for a likelihood 
net detriment to Canadian economic welfare from that acquisition.
Need for economically grounded reforms
The ICA’s net benefit standard imposes an additional hurdle for foreign acquirers relative to 
a domestic acquirer, reflecting a presumption that a foreign investor has different objectives 
and behaviour than does a Canadian investor. Since acquisitions of control by a comparable 
Canadian investor are permitted without review, investments by Canadians are implicitly 
assumed to produce net benefits for Canada (except where these are prohibited under 
competition law). Moreover, the net benefit factors imply that foreign investors inherently 
make different (and presumptively detrimental to the Canadian economy) decisions about 
their investments and production than do Canadian firms.
While the ICA purportedly serves economic objectives, history shows that Canadian 
foreign investment review is premised on expressly protectionist aims. Drawing from 
theory and empirical evidence concerning foreign investment in Canada, this paper argues 
that the ICA’s present presumption against foreign investments is economically incoherent, 
being premised on a blanket distinction between foreign and domestic investors that has 
no basis in economic theory or evidence. Indeed, economic theory would generally regard 
many of the present net benefit factors – such as those that relate to output, competition 
and productivity – as presumptively enhanced by a successful acquisition of assets. That 
is, whether foreign or domestic, a successful bidder will only be willing to pay a control 
premium where it expects to enhance the profitability of the acquired assets, and, in the 
absence of market failures, the successful investor will only accrue enhanced returns by 
improving the productivity of those assets.
Consequently, the present ICA regime arguably insulates Canadian managers from the 
full discipline of an open market for corporate control. Without the risk of displacement 
by a hostile acquirer, boards of directors may not have full incentive to rectify the under-
performance of their companies. Especially in Canada’s marketplace where there have 
historically been few activist investors, the ICA may insulate Canadian corporate boards 
11 
A. E. Safarian, “Simplifying the Rule Book: A Proposal to Reform and Clarify Canada’s Policy on Inward Foreign Direct 
Investment,” CD Howe Institute Commentary 425, May 3, 2015.
12 
Steven Globerman, “An Economic Assessment of the Investment Canada Act,” Fraser Institute, May 2015. 
13 
Matt Krzepkowski and Jack Mintz, “Canada’s Foreign Direct Investment Challenge: Reducing Barriers and Ensuring a 
Level Playing Field in the Face of Sovereign Wealth Funds and State-Owned Enterprises,” University of Calgary School of 
Public Policy Briefing Papers 3(3), 2010; and Matt Krzepkowski and Jack M. Mintz, “Squeaky Hinges: Widening the Door 
to Canadian Cross-Border Investment,” CD Howe Institute E-brief 69, 2008.
4from hostile acquirers. Indeed, industry participants have noted that the unpredictability 
and highly political character of the ICA regime have deterred foreign activist investors 
from challenging Canadian corporate boards.14 
The diminished competitive intensity may provide a candidate explanation for the chronic 
under-investment in research and development by the Canadian business sector,15 the noted 
lack of appetite for risk among Canadian managers,16 and Canada’s laggard productivity 
performance.17 Indeed, to the extent that the ICA shields Canadian firms (and their 
managers) from the discipline of competitive product markets (for which the ICA comprises 
a barrier to entry for foreign firms) and a rigorous market for corporate control (whereby 
laggard boards would be displaced), the ICA is at odds with the objectives of Canadian 
competition policy.
However, even while foreign investment should be presumed to contribute net benefit, 
various market failures or domestic welfare concerns might provide an economic basis 
for denying particular acquisitions. To this end, this paper surveys various classes of 
theoretically grounded concerns about the economic behaviour of foreign investors. These 
include anti-competitive conduct, knowledge externalities, or barriers to effective regulation 
or taxation.
Nonetheless, none of these classes of concerns provides a presumptive basis against foreign 
investments in Canada. That is, most foreign investments will be undertaken to increase the 
productive use of assets and will thereby enhance the allocative efficiency of the domestic 
economy. Indeed, where the concerns are related to the market behaviour of a commercial 
actor, an economically consistent approach for rejecting certain foreign investments should 
require a testable theory of harm and supporting evidence as the basis for anticipating a 
reduction in economic efficiency from the proposed transaction. 
Merger review under Competition Act provides a model
Foreign investment review should be procedurally and substantively reformed so as to 
parallel the regime that presently exists for the review of mergers under the Competition 
Act. 
Specifically, in the context of merger review, the Competition Act provides a robust legal  
framework for a specialized tribunal to evaluate the economic implications of proposed  
transactions. Indeed, the Competition Act was born of the desire for an economically  
literate antitrust regime that could consistently adjudicate disputed transactions on  
the basis of the latest advances in economic theory and evidence. As Lawson Hunter  
has chronicled, the 1986 enactment of the Competition Act rejected a model for direct  
ministerial review of mergers on an ad hoc, discretionary (and potentially politicized) 
14 
Scott Deveau, “How Canada’s Foreign Investment Rules are Curbing Activism,” Financial Post, Aug. 7, 2014,  
http://business.financialpost.com/investing/how-canadas-foreign-investment-rules-is-curbing-activism 
15 
Council of Canadian Academies, “Innovation and Business Strategy: Why Canada Falls Short - Report of the Expert Panel 
on Business Innovation,” June 2009, http://www.scienceadvice.ca/innovation.html. 
16 
Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity, “Management Matters,” Working Paper 12, March 2009; and Bill Currie, 
Lawrence Scott, and Andrew Dunn, The Future of Productivity: Clear Choices for a Competitive Canada. (Toronto: 
Deloitte Canada, 2009).
17 
Don Drummond, “Confessions of a Serial Productivity Researcher,” International Productivity Monitor 22, 2011,7.
5"public interest" basis in favour of an independent, justiciable regime for merger review, 
featuring standards formulated on the basis of economic principles and analysis.18
Reforming the ICA for economic coherence and justiciability
Drawing from the experience with merger review under the Competition Act, the ICA 
should be reformed to a review framework by: 
• Specifying economically grounded evaluative criteria, based in industrial 
organization and international economics, as the basis for any rejection of a proposed 
transaction; 
• Reversing the onus so as to require the minister or an independent agency to 
challenge a proposed transaction under these enumerated criteria as a net detriment; 
and
• Creating a specialized tribunal process – possibly integrated into the Competition 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction – to provide a consistent and transparent adjudication of 
whether the government has met the net detriment burden to deny a particular 
transaction.
This paper does not attempt to prescribe legislative wording, but drawing from economic 
literature on multi-national enterprises, suggests a set of economically coherent policy 
bases that could inform evaluative criteria. Specifically, concerns about economic efficiency 
might support rejecting transactions on the following grounds:
• Competitive concerns, involving the unilateral or joint exercise of market power in 
domestic or import markets;
• Positive externalities, involving the location of business activities that yield 
quantifiably significant social benefits in excess of the private benefits;
• Irreplaceable inputs, involving specialized products, scarce resources or critical 
infrastructure that are essential for particular products and industries;
• Information asymmetries and regulatory costs, involving the inability to effectively 
monitor corporate governance or enforce compliance for a particular foreign investor; 
• Fiscal consequences, where these involve an identifiably suboptimal allocation of 
productive resources in order to avoid domestic taxation; and
• Non-commercial considerations and influence by foreign states, involving 
decision-making by the foreign investor that is undertaken for political, rather than 
commercial, objectives.
In such a reformed regime, analogizing to the framework of the Competition Act, 
economic efficiency and domestic welfare maximization should guide the interpretation 
and application of such criteria. Analogous to the substantial lessening or prevention of 
competition test for denying a merger under competition law, a reformed ICA could adopt 
"net detriment to domestic welfare" as a justiciable standard for which economic theory and 
evidence could be similarly adduced.
18 
Lawson A.W. Hunter, “The New Merger Provisions of the Competition Act: Certainty or a Random Walk?” Canadian 
Competition Policy Record 58, 8(4), 1987, 59-60.
6While economic efficiency would have primacy under such a framework, acquisitions of 
designated cultural businesses and those triggering national security concerns would be 
evaluated under separate tests (as these are presently) than the net detriment standard for 
foreign investments generally. 
This paper then proceeds as follows: 1) examining the political origins and evolution of 
Canadian foreign investment review, as well as notable recent reviews under the ICA; 2) 
presenting the theory and evidence regarding the economic impact of foreign investment 
in Canada; 3) summarizing the conceptual and institutional history of merger review 
under the Competition Act; and 4) evaluating the present ICA framework and detailing 
recommendations for reform.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW IN CANADA
Origins of foreign investment review
Canada’s foreign investment review regime, originally enacted as the Foreign Investment 
Review Act (FIRA),19 was conceived during the rise of economic nationalism in the 
late 1960s and was politically motivated by fears of domination by foreign (particularly 
American) ownership of Canadian industry. While the rigid protectionism underlying 
the FIRA was tempered by the ICA’s less restrictive review process after its enactment in 
1985, the ICA retains many of the stated objectives (and implicit assumptions) of the earlier 
regime.
Michael Bliss and Stephen Azzi provide historical background to the political context and 
nationalist discourse that gave rise to FIRA.20 Bliss observes Canada’s historically open 
orientation to imports of foreign capital; however, beginning in the 1950s, he charts how 
Walter Gordon, a prominent Toronto business leader who was later to serve as finance 
minister in the Pearson government, spearheaded the rise of economic nationalism in 
Canada.21
Following anti-American backlash arising from then-industry minister C.D. Howe’s support 
for a U.S.-owned firm to build the first trans-Canada natural gas pipeline, Gordon was 
appointed to chair the Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects in 1957.22 While 
providing rather modest recommendations (e.g., for enhanced job opportunities and fuller 
19 
SC 1973-74, c. 46.
20 
Michael Bliss, “Founding FIRA: The Historical Background,” in Foreign Investment Review Law in Canada, James M. 
Spence and William P. Rosenfeld, eds., (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984),1-11; and Stephen Azzi, “Foreign Investment and the 
Paradox of Economic Nationalism,” in Canadas of the Mind: The Making and Unmaking of Canadian Nationalisms in the 
Twentieth Century, Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, eds. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2007).
21 
Bliss, 3. Bliss recounts that: “In the mid-1950s Walter Gordon, a management consultant with deep roots in the Toronto 
business community and strong personal contact in the Liberal party, began voicing concern about the degree of American 
ownership in Canada. He was joined by a few other Canadian businessmen, including some Canadian-born executives of 
branch plants, who began to worry about the possibility of poor corporate citizenship creating nationalist resentment.”
22 
Ibid., 3-4.
7corporate disclosure), the commission’s 1957 report encapsulated the nationalist sentiment 
that would underlie the FIRA.23
Re-entering cabinet in 1967, Gordon established the Special Task Force on the Structure 
of Canadian Industry, chaired by Melville Watkins. Its final report hypothesized potential 
costs for foreign control and, contending that “No other country … seems prepared to 
tolerate so high a degree of foreign ownership as exists in Canada,”24 recommended a new 
national policy with the centrepiece of “a special agency … to co-ordinate policies with 
respect to multi-national enterprise”25 so as to regulate the flow of capital alongside that of 
goods.26
Following the transition to the Trudeau government, further study was undertaken by Herb 
Gray with recommendations in 1972 to establish a screening agency to oversee foreign 
direct investments into Canadian whereby foreign takeovers would be flexibly reviewed for 
their costs and benefits for the Canadian economy. Gray’s report was particularly concerned 
with research and development and the exploitation of economies of scale; indeed, 
contending that a foreign investment review process “ought to be used as an economically 
rational instrument.”27
Review during the FIRA period
Bill C-132 enacted the FIRA, receiving assent in November 1973, and created the Foreign 
Investment Review Agency. According to the FIRA, it was adopted by Parliament “in 
recognition that the extent to which control of Canadian industry, trade and commerce has 
become acquired by persons other than Canadians and the effect thereof on the ability of 
Canadians to maintain effective control over their economic environment is a matter of 
national concern.”28 The FIRA applied both to acquisition and new businesses, and the FIR 
23 
Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects, Final Report (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1957), 390:
   “ At the root of Canadian concern about foreign investment is undoubtedly a basic, traditional sense of insecurity vis-
à-vis our friendly, albeit our much larger and more powerful neighbour, the United States. There is concern that as 
the position of American capital in the dynamic resource and manufacturing sectors becomes ever more dominant, 
our economy will inevitably become more and more integrated with that of the United States. Behind this is the fear 
that continuing integration might lead to economic domination by the United States and eventually to the loss of our 
political independence.”
 
Later serving as finance minister during the Pearson government, Gordon attempted to impose a 30 per cent take-over tax 
on foreign acquisitions of Canadian businesses in his 1963 budget but was forced to abandon the measure after widespread 
opposition (Bliss, 5). 
 
However, by the late 1960s, Bliss contends that anti-American sentiments had gained currency, and “[t]he notion of Canada 
as an object of American ‘imperialism’ became increasingly widespread.” (Ibid., 6). Prominent Canadian economists 
argued that Canada was being dominated by branch plants for which American parent companies made key decisions (Azzi, 
supra note, 75, citing, in particular, Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1970)) and, according to sociologist Gordon Laxer, “Surviving the Americanizing New Right,” Canadian 
Review of Sociology and Anthropology 37 (1) 1999, 64, cited by Azzi, 76), economic nationalism “became part of what it 
meant to be Canadian.”
24 
Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry, Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry 
(Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968), 363.
25 
Ibid., 395.
26 
Bliss, supra note 13, 6.
27 Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972), 453-454.
28 
FIRA, s. 2(1).
8Agency was mandated to review and advise the minister of industry, trade and commerce, 
who in turn would report to cabinet for the ultimate approval on any reviewable investment. 
Under FIRA, only foreign investments of “significant benefit” to Canada were to be 
approved and whether a takeover would result in “significant benefit” was assessed based 
on its contribution to job creation, Canadian participation in management, competition 
with existing industries, new technology, and compatibility with federal and provincial 
economic policies.29 FIRA permitted and provided enforcement measures for undertakings 
with respect to any aspect of the conduct of a business, including employment, investment, 
research and development, participation of Canadian shareholders and managers, 
productivity improvements, domestic sourcing of purchases, manufacturing and exports.
Through the late 1970s and early 1980s, the FIRA came under increasing criticism for 
the long review periods and uncertainty of the review process, with the perception that 
commitments sought by the FIRA Agency, frequently at the minister’s request, were 
commercially unreasonable.30 Of the reviewable proposed acquisitions between 1974 and 
1981, approximately 82 per cent of the applications concluded in an approval while nine 
per cent were disallowed and nine per cent were withdrawn.31 Similarly, of the reviewable 
new business applications between 1976 and 1981, approximately 83 per cent concluded 
in an approval while nine per cent were disallowed and seven per cent were withdrawn.32 
Evidencing the prolonged review process, there was significant carry-over between years, 
ranging on average as roughly 30 per cent of each year’s new cases during the interval. For 
potential foreign investors, Globerman observes that the regime added both indirect costs 
from the protracted review process and direct costs from complying with undertakings, 
arguing that the regime effected transfers from foreign investors to the beneficiaries of the 
undertakings.33 
Furthermore, Globerman notes that Canadian investors increased the average size of 
their domestic acquisitions following FIRA’s enactment, while the average size of foreign 
acquisitions declined. He argues that, to the extent that FIRA constituted a barrier for 
29 
Ibid., s. 2(2). Specifically section 2(2) of FIRA enumerated the following five factors as the basis for the review:
 
(a)  The effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and nature of economic activity in Canada, including, without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the utilization of parts, 
components and services produced in Canada, and on exports from Canada;
 
(b)  the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business enterprise or new business and in any industry 
or industries in Canada of which the business enterprise or new business forms would form a part;
 
(c)  the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development, product 
innovation and product variety in Canada;
 
(d) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within any industry or industries in Canada; and
 
(e)  the compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national industrial and economic policies, taking into 
consideration industrial and economic policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any province 
likely to be significantly affected by the acquisition or establishment.
30 
W. B. Rose, “Foreign Investment in Canada: The New Investment Canada Act,” International Lawyer 20, 1986, 21-22.
31 
Steven Globerman, “Canada’s Foreign Investment Review Agency and the Direct Investment Process in Canada,” Canadian 
Public Administration, 27, 1984, 313, 317, citing Foreign Investment Review Agency, Annual Report, various issues.
32 
Ibid., 318, citing FIRA, Annual Report, various issues.
33 
Ibid., 319, 324.
9potential foreign entrants, it increased the incentive for anti-competitive acquisitions by 
Canadian-owned firms and that this evidence of consolidation was crudely consistent with 
that hypothesis.34
As well, a 1983 GATT dispute settlement panel also found the frequent use of undertakings 
for domestic sourcing (reported as given in 70 per cent of approved investments for a 
sample of applications during 1980-1982) to be inconsistent with Canada’s commitments 
for equal treatment of domestic and imported products under Article III:4 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.35
From 1980 to 1982, as a reflection of the Trudeau government’s policies to seek increased 
Canadian ownership and control of the economy, the review process became markedly 
more onerous.36 However, the onset of a domestic recession in 1982 compelled a policy shift 
towards the attraction of foreign investment, resulting in the replacement of the minister 
responsible for the FIRA and expedited procedures for smaller transactions.37
Enactment of the ICA regime
Aiming to distance itself from the FIRA’s stigma with foreign investors, the Mulroney 
government enacted the ICA as its first major piece of business legislation, stating that it 
would send “a message to the world that, once again, Canada welcomes investment.”38
The purposive clause of the new ICA reflected this intention for greater openness.39 The 
ICA created a process with prescribed timelines and review thresholds in order to allow 
smaller transactions to proceed without review. As well, the ICA enhanced the clarity of 
what change-of-control transactions would be within the scope of review. Nonetheless, 
the Mulroney government anticipated that, while only 10 per cent of foreign investment 
transactions would face a review, 90 per cent of the transactional value of foreign 
investments in Canada would be subject to review.40
The primary change was to amend the previous significant benefit threshold to the net 
benefit standard. Importantly, the enumerated (but non-exhaustive) five factors41 for the 
34 
Ibid., 327.
35 
Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, ACTL/5504 - 30S/140 (July 25, 1983, adopted on Feb. 7, 
1984). BISD 30S/140, 1984.
36 
Rose, supra note 25, 21.
37 
Ibid.
38 
Statement of the Hon. Sinclair Stevens, minister for the department of regional industrial expansion (Dec. 7, 1984), cited 
in George C. Glover, Jr., Douglas C. New, Marc M. Lacourciere, “The Investment Canada Act: A New Approach to the 
Regulation of Foreign Investment in Canada,” The Business Lawyer 41, 1985, 83-84.
39 
On its enactment, ICA, supra note 1, s. 2, read:
   “ Recognizing that increased capital and technology would benefit Canada, the purpose of this Act is to encourage 
investment in Canada by Canadians and non-Canadians that contributes to economic growth and employment 
opportunities and to provide for the review of significant investments in Canada by non-Canadians in order to ensure 
such benefit to Canada.”
 
2009 amendments to the ICA revised this statement to incorporate national security (SC 2009, c. 2, s. 445).
40 
Glover et al, supra note 33, 98.
41 
The present sixth factor, pursuant to ICA, supra note 1, s. 20(f), was later added: “the contribution of the investment to 
Canada’s ability to compete in world markets.”
10
evaluation of net benefit were a near repetition of those specified in the FIRA.42 This eased 
standard was regarded as a key signal of receptiveness to foreign investment.
Evolution of review under the ICA
Indeed, while self-selection (as under the FIRA) may have continued, in the initial two 
decades of the ICA, almost all applications under the ICA were ultimately approved, with 
undertakings as the anecdotal exception rather than the rule prior to 2000.43 From 1985 
until 2008, of over 1,500 non-cultural reviews undertaken by the minister under the ICA, 
only one proposal was disallowed.44 Baldwin, Gellatly and Sabourin conclude that the 
relaxation in the regulatory regime for foreign investment corresponded with a general 
increase in assets under foreign control compared with the FIRA era.45
Notably, prior to the 2009 amendments, the ICA did not mandate public reporting,46 
and statistics on applications, approvals and undertakings are not publicly available. 
Nonetheless, much of inward foreign direct investments would appear to be subject to 
notice and review under the ICA: between 2005 and 2010, transactions involving the 
control of assets totalling $394 billion were the subject of notifications (comprising $146 
billion of assets, of which $4 billion were new businesses and the remainder acquisitions) 
or applications (comprising $247 billion of assets) under the ICA.47 This represents 
approximately 84 per cent of the net change in the value of Canadian business assets under 
foreign control during the 2005-2010 period.48 
Details of undertakings are not available owing to confidentiality concerns regarding 
commercially sensitive information; however, after 2000, commentators anecdotally 
noted an increased tendency for Industry Canada to seek undertakings (particularly for 
maintaining head offices, employment and capital expenditure levels) prior to approving 
transactions.49 Since undertakings are confidential, the federal government’s 2009 
enforcement of undertakings against U.S. Steel – and the subsequent litigation concerning 
the penalties for non-compliance – provides unique insight into the content of recent 
undertakings. For its 2007 acquisition of Hamilton-based Stelco Inc., U.S. Steel had 
provided 31 undertakings, including two that required minimum annual steel production 
42 
As observed by Glover et al, supra note 33, 95.
43 
Hutton and MacDonald, supra note 6, 118.
44 
CPRP, supra note 7, 29.
45 
John R. Baldwin, Guy Gellatly, and David Sabourin, “Changes in Foreign Control under Different Regulatory Climates: 
Multinationals in Canada,” Statistics Canada Analytical Paper 11-624-MIE — no. 013, 2006.
46 
ICA, supra note 1, s. 38.1 now requires that: “The Director shall, for each fiscal year, submit a report on the administration 
of this Act, other than Part IV.1 [investments injurious to national security], to the Minister and the Minister shall make 
the report available to the public.” Despite this statutory direction, only the annual report for 2009-2010 has yet been made 
available: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/h_lk81126.html (as of June 28, 2013).
47 Investment Canada Act Annual Report 2009-2010, Industry Canada, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk81132.
html#iau . Reported figures represent the asset value of the Canadian business to be acquired, based on the corporation’s 
most recent audited financial statements, not on the purchase price.
48 
Based on calculations using Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 179-0004 Corporations Returns Act (CRA), major financial 
variables, annual. Admittedly, gross changes in foreign control of Canadian assets would have been the more appropriate 
denominator; however, such statistics are not available in Statistics Canada’s CANSIM tables.
49 
Shawn C. D. Neylan, “Capital Inflows Should Count As a Benefit to Canada under the Investment Canada Act,” Canadian 
Competition Record 21(4), 2004, 61.
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of 4,345,000 net tonnes and maintained an average level of employment at the Canadian 
business of 3,105 employees on a full-time equivalent.50
Despite the somewhat rubber-stamp perception of the ICA, Hutton and MacDonald observe 
that overtures by the state-owned China MinMetals’ 2004 to acquire Noranda Metals 
reinvigorated interest by Canadian businesses and politicians in use of the ICA to block 
certain foreign investments.51 As the Chinese Canadian Business Council later observed, 
this proposed acquisition was met with a “national outpouring of anxiety that Chinese 
ownership would either represent risk to Canada’s security of commodities supply or would 
ignore Canadian corporate law …”52 The bid was withdrawn reportedly for commercial 
reasons, owing to MinMetals having failed to secure requisite financing.53 However, the 
episode is regarded as the political impetus for the government to issue guidelines in 2007 
for investments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs).54 
Furthermore, foreign takeovers of certain prominent Canadian-owned businesses have 
given rise to waves of nationalist sentiment and concerns about the hollowing out of 
corporate Canada.55 In the mid-2000s, foreign acquisitions of firms like Hudson’s Bay 
Company, Alcan, Falconbridge, Inco and Algoma Steel were given as examples of this 
perceived trend. 56 Certain Canadian executives, such as Dominic D’Alessandro, then-CEO 
of Manulife Financial, urged government to adopt more restrictive policies toward foreign 
direct investment, and Gordon Nixon, CEO of Royal Bank, announced that: “We have not 
only seen the disappearance of major Canadian household names, but the loss of Canadian 
presence in industries where we have long had traditional strengths.”57
Following the Harper government’s 2007 budget commitment to undertake a review of 
Canada’s competition policies and foreign investment review process, evaluation of the ICA 
framework’s efficacy was made a key aspect of the CPRP’s mandate.58 During its review, 
the CPRP received wide-ranging submissions on the appropriate policy balance for foreign 
direct investments.59 In its final report in June 2008, the CPRP rejected the contention that 
50 
Details of the relevant undertakings are provided in United States Steel Corporation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 
FCA 176 at para. 9, aff’g 2010 FC 642.
51 
Hutton and MacDonald, supra note 6, 119.
52 
Letter of Canada-China Business Council, “Re: Canada China Business Council Submission to Competition Policy Review 
Panel,” Jan. 11, 2008, Industry Canada http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cprp-gepmc.nsf/vwapj/Canada_China_Business_
Council.pdf/$FILE/Canada_China_Business_Council.pdf .
53 
Jacquie McNish, “The Great Canadian Mining Disaster,” Globe and Mail, Nov. 25, 2006, http://www.globeinvestor.com/
servlet/story/GAM.20061125.RINCOFINAL25/GIStory/commodities/ .
54 
Hutton and MacDonald, supra note 6, 137.
55 
Oliver Borgers and Emily Rix, “Foreign Investment Screening under Canada’s Investment Canada Act,” Canadian 
Competition Law Review 25, 2012, 468, 470; Hutton and MacDonald, 119. 
56 
“Is Corporate Canada Being Hollowed Out?” CBC, May 7, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/news/pointofview/2007/05/is-
corporate-canada-being-hollowed-out.html .
57 
Ibid.
58 
Competition Policy Review Panel, “Terms of Reference,” 2007, Industry Canada, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cprp-gepmc.
nsf/eng/h_00004.html . 
59 
The CPRP’s discussion paper, “Sharpening Canada’s Edge,” Oct. 30, 2007, Industry Canada, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/
cprp-gepmc.nsf/eng/00014.html#issues summarized the policy context:
   “ In its current form, the review mechanism under the ICA has raised concerns from foreign investors over a lack of 
predictability regarding how the net benefit test will be applied and what combination of factors is required to be met. 
On the other hand, the flexibility inherent to the net benefit test provides the minister with discretion to ensure, on a 
case-by-case basis, that the FDI serves Canadian interests as they evolve over time.”
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the ICA was unduly restrictive relative to Canada’s peer economies, observing Canada’s 
relatively high FDI/GDP among industrialized economies and citing a Conference Board 
analysis of effective investment restrictiveness.60 Nonetheless, to address the perceived 
restrictiveness, the CPRP made several recommendations for reform of the ICA to enhance 
Canada’s attractiveness to foreign capital without undermining safeguards for its national 
interests.61 These included raising thresholds for review and uniformity of thresholds 
among industries.62 As well, the CPRP recommended enhanced use of guidelines and 
enacting reporting obligations to improve transparency and predictability – particularly 
recommending that the minister be required to provide public reasons for any rejection.63
Significantly, the CPRP recommended amending relevant sections of the ICA from “net 
benefit to Canada” to “contrary to Canada’s national interest” in order to reverse the ICA’s 
onus.64 Notably, the CPRP did not prescribe any procedural or institutional reforms to 
accompany this recommendation.
Just prior to the CPRP’s final report, in May 2008, then-minister of industry Jim Prentice 
rejected the proposed acquisition of aerospace technology manufacturer Macdonald, 
Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. by Alliant Techsystems Inc., a U.S. aerospace and defence 
firm. Commentators observed that this was the first time that a proposed non-cultural 
acquisition was rejected since the ICA’s 1985 enactment.65 No public reasons were given 
for the rejection, but reports indicated that concerns were that the sale of MDA’s Radarsat 
2 satellite to a foreign investor would potentially compromise Canada’s exercise of 
sovereignty over its Arctic territory.66 While national security grounds were not at that 
time an explicit basis for rejection under the ICA, commentators hypothesized that the 
acquisition was refused on national security grounds.67
60 
CPRP, supra note 7, 29, citing Andrea Mandel-Campbell, “How Canada Stacks Up,” Conference Board of Canada, 2008. 
This evaluation was presented in contrast to the OECD FDI restrictiveness index, in which Canada has ranked as more 
highly restrictive than other OECD economies. As the OECD recognizes, the index considers only statutory barriers and 
not effective institutional restrictions or less formal political interference in the review of investments.
61 
Ibid., 31. CPRP endorsed the approach outlined in J. Timothy Kennish, “Evaluation of the Operation and Effectiveness 
of the Investment Canada Act and Recommendations for Changes to this Legislation,” research paper prepared for the 
Competition Policy Review Panel, March 2008. Specifically: 
   “ The Panel believes that Canada should retain an investment review process, but it should be one of exceptional 
application in keeping with the practices of similarly situated industrialized countries. Consistent with Canada’s legal 
traditions and our international reputation for sound governance practices, the review process should be predictable, 
timely and transparent.”
62 
CPRP, 31-32. Prior to the 2009 amendments to the ICA, separate thresholds applied to non-federally regulated financial 
services, transportation services (including pipelines) and uranium mining (so-called “sensitive sectors”). The minister of 
finance is responsible for the review and approval of foreign investments involving financial institutions regulated pursuant 
to the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act, and such foreign investments are exempt from review under the ICA. 
63 
Ibid., 33.
64 
Ibid., 32. The CPRP contended:
 
  “ A number of issues would be addressed by these changes. First, it would align the test with Canada’s basic policy 
premise that FDI generates positive benefits for the country. Second, it would counter the negative and misleading 
perception that the ICA discourages — and that Canada does not welcome — FDI.”
65 
Mark Katz and Jim Dinning, “Developments in Canadian Merger Control and Foreign Investment Review,” Lexpert 52, 
June 2009, 54, http://www.dwpv.com/~/media/Files/PDF/Developments_in_Canadian_Merger_Control_and_Foreign_
Investment_Review.ashx,6 .
66 
Ibid.
67 
Ibid.
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Following the June 2008 final report of the CPRP, the Harper government amended the 
ICA by enacting Bill C-10 in March 2009. The amendments followed many of the CPRP’s 
recommendations – specifically, increasing the review thresholds, eliminating differential 
thresholds for sensitive sectors (except for cultural businesses), requiring the minister to 
report annually on the ICA’s administration (although not stipulating the content of such 
reporting), requiring the minister to provide both opinions about proposed transactions 
on prescribed timelines, and mandating the minister to provide public reasons for the 
disallowance of any transaction. As well, the Bill C-10 amendments established a discrete 
review process for “investments injurious to national security.”68 However, Bill C-10 did 
not enact the CPRP’s reversed-onus recommendation and the reason for this decision 
was not clear.69 More recently, in Bill C-60, which received royal assent in June 2013, the 
government amended the basis for the ICA’s review thresholds for most non-SOE investors 
to enterprise value from the previous book value basis. The CPRP had recommended the 
move to enterprise value to reflect the value of intangible property and goodwill that would 
not be reflected in an acquisition target’s book value.
Subsequent to the 2009 amendments, several other high-profile proposed foreign 
investments have raised the prospect of disallowance under the ICA. The 2010 bid by 
Australian mining company BHP Billiton for Potash Corporation came under intense 
public scrutiny, with the Saskatchewan government speaking publicly against the 
proposed transaction. According to MacKinnon, the company was a “swing producer” 
of potash, with its production influencing the worldwide price of the commodity, and the 
Saskatchewan government worried that a foreign acquirer might extract potash at a pace 
that would threaten provincial royalties.70 In November 2003, the minister sent a notice to 
BHP, advising that the federal government was not satisfied that the acquisition would be 
of net benefit to Canada and providing 30 days for BHP to make additional representations 
and undertakings.71 Ten days later, BHP withdrew the bid,72 and, since no final decision was 
reached, the minister did not provide public reasons for his preliminary notice.
The bid by the London Stock Exchange for the Toronto Stock Exchange also raised public 
concern regarding the relocation of the merged group’s headquarters, and the Ontario 
government expressed concern about the transaction, publicly referring to the TSX as a 
“strategic asset.”73 No decision was reached under the ICA since TSX shareholders rejected 
the proposed transaction in late June 2011.74
68 
Incorporated as ICA, supra note 1, part IV, 1.
69 
Sandra Walker, “Amending the Investment Canada Act: An Assessment of the Government’s Response to the Wilson 
Report,” Canadian Competition Record 30, 2009, 33.
70 
Janice MacKinnon, “The Potash Takeover Bid: The Deal that Wasn’t,” Policy Options 49, December 2010, 50. 
71 
“Minister of Industry Confirms Notice Sent to BHP Billiton,” Nov. 3, 2010, Industry Canada, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/
site/064.nsf/eng/06031.html .
72 
Brenda Bouw, Tim Kiladze, and Steven Chase, “BHP Withdraws Potash Bid,” Globe and Mail, Nov. 14, 2010,  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/bhp-withdraws-potash-bid/article565929/#dashboard/follows/ .
73 
Mark Katz, Elisa Kearney, and James Dinning, “Foreign Investment: A Recurring Nightmare for the Canadian 
Government?” 2011, https://www.dwpv.com 
74 
Boyd Erman and Karen Howlett, “Shareholders Reject Proposed Merger of TMX and LSE,” Globe and Mail, June 
29, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/shareholders-reject-proposed-merger-of-tmx-and-lse/
article584975/#dashboard/follows/ .
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Most recently, the concurrent bids by China’s state-owned Chinese National Offshore Oil 
Company Ltd. for Nexen Energy and Malaysia’s state-owned Petronas for Progress Energy 
Resources Corp. attracted substantial public interest. Although the government ultimately 
approved the acquisitions, the approval followed arguably politicized public discussion of 
the transaction.75
In respect to the transactions themselves, the federal government also announced that both 
acquirers had made significant undertakings, relating to governance, transparency and 
disclosure, commercial orientation (including “an adherence to Canadian laws and practices 
as well as free-market principles”), employment and capital investments.76 
When approving the acquisitions in mid-December 2012, the government simultaneously 
issued a policy statement and revised guidelines for SOEs, also stating that: “Investments 
by foreign SOEs to acquire control of a Canadian oilsands business will, going forward, 
be found to be of net benefit on an exceptional basis only.”77 According to the revised 
guidelines, “investors will be expected to address in their plans and undertakings, the 
inherent characteristics of SOEs, specifically that they are susceptible to state influence. 
Investors will also need to demonstrate their strong commitment to transparent and 
commercial operations.”78 
Additionally, Bill C-60, receiving assent in June 2013, introduced a definition for “state-
owned investor,”79 specific review thresholds for SOEs,80 and provision for the minister to 
deem an entity controlled by an SOE.81 The Canadian Bar Association had criticized these 
amendments as creating further investor uncertainty because of the broad reach of the SOE 
definition and the ministerial discretion for deeming an acquisition to involve an SOE.82
75 
The opposition NDP called for public hearings regarding the transactions, and Justin Trudeau (then a candidate for the 
federal Liberal party leadership) publicly endorsed the acquisitions. John Ibbitson, “What Would the Opposition Have Done 
Differently With CNOOC-Nexen?” Globe and Mail, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/what-
would-the-opposition-have-done-differently-with-cnoocnexen/article6189130/#dashboard/follows/ .
76 
“M&A Update: Investment Canada Act: SOE Guidelines and CNOOC-Nexen,” Stikeman Elliott, Dec. 17, 2012,  
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Industry Canada, Dec. 7, 2012, http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?nid=711489 .
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THE ECONOMIC BASIS FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW
Empirical evidence on foreign direct investment
Despite public concerns about deleterious effects from foreign investments into Canada, 
the evidence is strongly that the foreign inflow of capital benefits the Canadian economy – 
particularly with respect to the direct productivity improvements and indirect competitive 
intensity for which foreign-controlled firms are responsible. Baldwin and Gellatly provide 
an extensive survey of the empirical evidence from Statistics Canada programs.83 They 
outline the following conclusions:
• Compared to domestic firms, foreign-controlled firms are generally larger, have 
higher labour productivity, have greater capital intensity, pay higher wages and 
employ greater numbers of non-production workers. Such performance advantages 
persist even controlling for size and industry;
• Foreign-controlled firms are more likely to have a Canadian head office than are 
domestic firms, and foreign takeovers have indeed contributed to a net gain in head 
offices. Moreover, foreign establishments do not tend to be truncated branch plant 
operations, but rather make large investments in knowledge capital (i.e., innovation, 
advanced technology and skilled labour) in order to compete in innovation-
intensive industries (indeed, exhibiting the incentives for “endogenous technological 
progress”);84
• Compared to domestic firms, foreign-controlled firms are more likely to use advanced 
technologies, have a research and development division and to introduce world-first 
(rather than imitative) innovations;
• Foreign-controlled firms gravitate to industrial sectors where they can exploit 
comparative advantages (particularly where there are returns to scale and capital 
intensity or where competition involves technological innovation);
• Foreign-controlled firms have contributed to aggregate productivity gains in three 
ways: 1) by displacing less productive plants by competition for market share 
(particularly of importance during the 1980s and 1990s); 2) by diffusing new 
technological capabilities to domestic firms (so-called “knowledge spillovers”); and 3) 
restructuring following the acquisition of domestic assets.85
Several other empirical observations regarding foreign-controlled firm behaviour in Canada 
are particularly notable. First, following the free trade agreement (FTA) with the United 
States, foreign-controlled plants demonstrated greater plant-level specialization than did 
domestic plants, evidencing a productivity-enhancing restructuring to adapt to competition 
83 
John R. Baldwin and Guy Gellatly, “Global Links: Multinationals in Canada: An Overview of Research at Statistics 
Canada,” Statistics Canada Research Paper, Catalog no. 11-622-MIE, no. 014, November 2007, http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/
bsolc/olc-cel/olc-cel?catno=11-622-MIE2007014&lang=eng .
84 
Technological progress is “endogenous” in the sense that productivity-enhancing innovations occur as a result of risky 
investments in R&D for which any rational innovator requires an ultimate economic incentive.
85 
Baldwin and Gellatly, supra note 72, 7-10.
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and rationalize integrated supply chains.86 Such specialization was most apparent in 
industries that witnessed the greatest tariff reductions under the FTA, a finding consistent 
with the theoretical prediction of positive impacts from trade liberalization on productive 
efficiency.87
Second, following from more intensive investments in knowledge capital by foreign-
controlled firms, establishments of foreign multinationals have more stable output in 
response to declining demand and lower employment volatility in response to output 
changes (i.e., fewer layoffs during downturns) than do domestic firms.88
Third, in manufacturing industries, foreign-controlled firms demonstrate a tendency 
towards entry by acquisition of existing assets rather than green-field construction of new 
plants, thereby contributing to productivity by restructuring operations and transferring 
market share to more efficient operations.89 With higher plant productivity than domestic 
counterparts, foreign-controlled firms contributed roughly 2/3 of Canada’s manufacturing 
sector labour productivity growth during 1980 to 1999 while only comprising 40 per cent of 
that sector’s employment.90
Fourth, in the pursuit of innovation, foreign-controlled firms have comparable research 
linkages with universities relative to domestic firms, and foreign multinationals both engage 
intra-firm research networks and rely on domestic R&D units to a greater extent than 
domestic counterparts.91 
Fifth, foreign-controlled firms also appear to contribute forward (downstream) and 
backward (upstream) spillovers to domestic productivity performance via inter-industry 
linkages.92 Such spillovers may accrue from improvement in the quality or complementarity 
of intermediate inputs, or from intensified competition among domestic firms to supply to, 
or distribute for, the more productive foreign entrants.
Theoretical impacts of foreign investments
These empirical observations raise questions about the reasons for the differential 
performance of foreign-controlled firms operating in Canada. Rao, Souare and Wang 
86 
John R. Baldwin, Desmond Beckstead, and Richard Caves, “Changes in the Diversification of Canadian Manufacturing 
Firms and Plants (1973-1997): A Move to Specialization,” Statistics Canada Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper 
Series. Catalog no. 11F0019MIE2002179, 2001.
87 
John R. Baldwin, Richard E. Caves, and Wulong Gu, “Responses to Trade Liberalization: Changes in Product 
Diversification in Foreign- and Domestic-controlled Plants,” Statistics Canada Economic Analysis (EA) Research Paper 
Series, Catalog no. 11F0027MIE2005031, 2005.
88 
John R. Baldwin and Naginder Dhaliwal, “Labour Productivity Differences Between Domestic and Foreign-Controlled 
Establishments in the Canadian Manufacturing Sector,” Statistics Canada Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper 
Series, Catalog no. 11F0019MIE2000118, 200.
89 
John R. Baldwin and Wulong Gu, “Plant Turnover and Productivity Growth in Canadian Manufacturing,” Industrial and 
Corporate Change 15, 2006, 417.
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Baldwin and Gu, “Global Links: Multinationals, Foreign Ownership and Productivity Growth in Canadian Manufacturing,” 
Statistics Canada: The Canadian Economy in Transition Series, Catalog no. 11-622-MIE2005009, 2005.
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John R. Baldwin and Petr Hanel, “Multinationals and the Canadian Innovation Process,” Statistics Canada Analytical 
Studies Branch Research Paper Series, Catalog no. 11F0019MIE2000151, 2000.
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Wulong Gu and Yanling Wang, “FDI, Absorptive Capacity, and Productivity Growth: The Role of Inter-Industry Linkages,” 
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provide a survey of the economic explanations for the observed investment by certain 
multinational firms in acquisition of assets in foreign jurisdictions.93
In general, the literature explains this behaviour by two classes of models for multinational 
firms, in which the foreigner’s decision to invest directly (rather than contracting with a 
domestic firm) results from: 1) some market failure that prevents a firm with firm-specific 
intangible assets (e.g., unique technology or managerial practices) from capturing the 
surplus by exporting or licensing; or 2) the allocation of steps of production according to 
the comparative advantages of different jurisdictions, while integrating of the steps within 
a single firm (acting as a contractual nexus) in order to solve contracting/monitoring 
problems.94 The former class of model, following Krugman, explains horizontally 
integrated multinationals as engaged in a trade-off between geographic proximity to 
markets and economies of scale in centralized production; the latter class, following 
Helpman, explain vertically integrated multinationals as allocating production based on 
differences in productive factors and their costs.95
Absent some additional market failure, either class of explanation would generally indicate 
the prima facie efficiency of inward FDI. For horizontal acquisitions, foreign expansion 
into a domestic market would eliminate the double-marginalization that exists where the 
relevant product is exported or licensed and result in greater allocative efficiency. For 
vertical acquisitions, production is rationalized according to the comparative advantage 
of the given economy and, by reducing contractual frictions, the vertically integrated firm 
provides a channel for a more efficient allocation of resources and consequent gains from 
trade.
Where such horizontal or vertical integration is a foreign entrant’s objective, any attempted 
acquisition of domestic assets should also be efficient (absent additional market failures). A 
rational investor will only bid a premium to acquire control of assets equal to the expected 
gain in returns from the acquisition, and, in general, a successful foreign investor (i.e. 
one who is willing to pay a premium for control of Canadian assets) must then expect to 
improve the productivity of the acquired assets.
Importantly, the present inclusion of the effect on employment as a factor in the evaluation 
of net benefit lacks an economic basis. To the extent that the factor is concerned with 
employment levels in the given enterprise, this consideration (and any complementary 
undertakings) is at odds with firm-level incentives to enhance productivity. Undertakings 
to maintain particular levels of employment and output (such as those enforced against 
U.S. Steel) inhibit firms from adjusting production and re-allocating labour in order to 
boost plant productivity. Research demonstrates the importance of labour reallocation (and 
particularly that within plants) as part of the creative destruction process for productivity 
93 
Someshwar Rao, Malick Souare and Weimin Wang, “Canadian Inward and Outward Direct Investment: Assessing the Impacts” 
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Ibid., 321-322.
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improvements.96 While distributional concerns and buffers for employment disruptions are 
important policy considerations, these should not be the focus of foreign investment review 
but rather addressed through fiscal measures for progressive income redistribution and 
social insurance.
Theoretically, the rational acquisition and reallocation of domestic assets by foreign entrants 
should prima facie enhance productivity of the assets themselves and intensify competition 
within the relevant industry. Absent additional market failures, such unit cost reduction 
would improve consumer surplus and, in competitive labour markets, wage gains should 
accrue with increases in labour productivity. However, such transitions would also involve 
short-term disruptions to firm-level employment as labour is reallocated. Yet, while foreign 
entry might intensify these processes, the efficient allocation of production within firms and 
displacement of laggard competitors is the broad objective of competition policy.
Channels for reduction of domestic welfare by foreign investments
Caves summarizes economically grounded policy justifications for the regulation of foreign 
investment.97 As a preliminary, Caves notes that a domestic government is concerned 
with maximizing domestic income rather than global income. Notably, where the efficient 
allocation (for which domestic output and global welfare are maximized) diverges from the 
maximization of domestic income for a particular economy, a self-interested country would 
rationally pursue policies that produce the greatest increase in domestic income, even if less 
efficient.98
Drawing from Caves’ arguments, there may be grounds to regulate particular foreign 
investments to the extent that a foreign acquirer might make use of particular assets in 
a manner that is suboptimal for the domestic economy. Again, given firms’ profit- (and 
productivity-) maximizing aims in any acquisition, foreign acquisitions are presumptively 
beneficial for the Canadian economy. However, there may be circumstances in which there 
is a theoretical and evidentiary basis to believe that the acquired domestic assets might be 
utilized in a manner detrimental to aggregate domestic welfare. 
96 
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For example, J. N. Bhagwati and R. A. Brecher, “National Welfare in an Open Economy in the Presence of Foreign-Owned 
Factors of Production,” Journal of International Economics 10, 1980, 103, provide comparative statics for domestic welfare 
before and after trade liberalization (notably, using models that do not incorporate endogenous technological progress): 
where foreigners supply capital, citizens supply labour and goods are capital intensive, trade liberalization may have the 
effect of diminishing domestic income as returns to capital rise and relative wages fall. Such a conclusion would need 
qualification where there were dynamic improvements in labour productivity from endogenous innovation. As well, 
withholding taxes on foreign repatriation of domestically sourced capital income could arguably be used to mitigate a 
portion these impacts – albeit with an efficiency/domestic welfare trade-off.
 
Additionally, following from the potential divergence in efficiency and domestic income, a purely self-interested 
country, who is concerned only with static (rather than dynamic) gains, should seek to monopolize its sales abroad while 
monopsonizing its foreign purchases. Similarly, such a self-interested economy would seek to ensure that economic rents 
from domestic technological advances or natural resources are captured domestically. However, Caves also observes the 
practical difficulty with enabling market power for such “national champions” vis-à-vis foreigners while safeguarding 
competitive domestic markets.
19
For example, there are several categories of rational conduct by foreign multinationals 
where domestic welfare could conceivably be impaired:
• The multinational might have anti-competitive motives, acquiring assets or 
establishing a business in order to exercise market power or raise costs for 
competitors. Such a prospective monopolist would be willing to pay a control 
premium for assets that reflects the expected monopoly profits and would outbid any 
competitive entrant whose expected profit from the acquisition would be limited to 
expected productivity gains;
• The particular assets might yield identifiable positive externalities for the domestic 
economy. For example, providing irreplaceable intermediation services for financial 
transactions or providing empirically quantifiable cluster effects or knowledge 
spillovers. If economies of scale are involved in R&D activities, there might be reason 
to suspect that a foreign acquirer would not take account of these externalities for the 
domestic economy when locating business activities and might centralize these in a 
foreign jurisdiction; 
• Induced innovation models, where the direction of technological change responds to 
relative factor prices, also flag possible circumstances where a foreign multinational 
might not innovate optimally for the domestic economy. Specifically, with 
technological innovation requiring fixed R&D costs, multinationals might centralize 
R&D activities and innovate for the factor prices of a larger foreign market, resulting 
in a second-best innovation for the domestic market;99
• The impact on taxation revenues or regulatory effectiveness as a result of the changed 
structure of commercial activities may also be a concern. Domestic regulators 
might face informational asymmetries regarding the corporate governance of the 
given multinational, making enforcement difficult. The structure of intra-corporate 
activities to avoid domestic taxation might be a particular concern. As well, where 
rents from innovation or resource extraction are concerned, a government might be 
concerned that the multinational would structure worldwide production in a manner 
that minimized the rents accruing in the domestic economy;100 
• Finally, there might be concerns about non-commercial considerations in decision-
making by a controlling entity – for instance, where the acquirer’s management has a 
high degree of integration with a foreign government with geopolitical aims. Notably, 
a foreign government’s aim to secure particular inputs for its economy would not 
necessarily be an inefficient objective,101 unless there was some anti-competitive effect 
of excluding other willing buyers from essential inputs.
99 
Syed Ahmad, “On the Theory of Induced Invention,” The Economic Journal 76, 1966, 344, provides the seminal theory. 
Notably, Ian Keay, “Scapegoats or Responsive Entrepreneurs: Canadian Manufacturers, 1907-1990,” Explorations in 
Economic History 37, 2000, 217, does not find historical evidence of such suboptimal technological change within Canadian 
manufacturing. 
100 
For instance, where a multinational controls resource deposits in multiple jurisdictions and can influence the price of the 
commodity, it might have incentive to limit production in order to increase its economic rents and would allocate production 
to the lower royalty jurisdiction.
101 
For instance, to the extent that a state-influenced foreign firm sought to channel particular commodities to its home economy, 
it would face the opportunity cost of the going market price at which the commodity could have otherwise been sold.
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COMPETITION LAW AS A MODEL FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW
While foreign investment is presumptively beneficial for the domestic economy, the 
previous section outlined circumstances in which there may be economically grounded 
policy bases for rejecting certain foreign acquisitions. The conceptual evolution of 
Canadian competition policy provides an analog for the reform of the ICA around 
economically coherent objectives.
As McFetridge recounts, the enactment of the Competition Act in 1986 ushered in a 
modern regime in which economic analysis was to be central in the design, interpretation 
and enforcement of competition policy.102 As Hunter explains, the act put in place an 
economically literate regime for merger review, in which “the law is essentially an attempt 
to map the principles of industrial organization onto the legislative words and processes 
enacted by Parliament.”103 Economic scholarship has continued to guide the evolution of 
the modernized regime, informing amendments to the act that reformed provisions which 
were at odds with economic theory and which enhanced the scope for economic analysis.104 
Even more fundamentally, after being bedevilled by multiple disparate goals, Canadian 
competition law has converged on the predictable and logical objective of efficiently 
allocating society’s productive resources.105
Indeed, the centrality of economic efficiency was set out in the 1969 report of the Economic 
Council of Canada, which provided the impetus for the modernization of Canadian 
competition law.106 To this end, the council had recommended a two-track approach 
whereby criminal sanctions apply only to a limited range of per se illegal offences. For the 
reviewable practices track, the council recommended “the presumption would be that while 
the practices could well be harmless or even beneficial to the public in some circumstances, 
they could be harmful in others,”107 and proposed the creation of a civil tribunal to review 
whether mergers and certain trade practices were “on balance in the public interest.”108
Prior to 1986, mergers could be challenged pursuant to the monopolization offence in 
the Combines Investigation Act (CIA).109 However, without evaluative criteria, the public 
detriment element of the offence proved an impediment to challenging mergers under the 
CIA – particularly given the criminal standard required.
102 
Donald G. McFetridge, “Economics and Canadian Competition Policy,” Canadian Competition Law Review 25, 2012, 540.
103 
Hunter, supra note 13, 60.
104 
McFetridge, 541.
105 
Ibid., 557-558, citing Thomas Ross, “Viewpoint: Canadian Competition Policy: Progress and Prospects,” Canadian Journal 
of Economics 37, 2004, 252.
106 
Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy 19, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969) :
   “ Essentially we are advocating the adoption of a single objective for competition policy: the improvement of economic 
efficiency and the avoidance of economic waste, with a view of enhancing the wellbeing of Canadians.”
107 
Ibid., 120.
108 
Ibid., 109-113.
109 
RSC 1970, c. C-23 [CIA], s. 33. Under CIA, s. 1, “monopoly” was defined as a situation where: 
   “ one or more persons either substantially or completely control throughout Canada or any area thereof the class 
or species of business in which they are engaged and have operated that business or are likely to operate it to the 
detriment or against the interest of the public …”
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After several abortive attempts to reform competition law (culminating in the decision  
by the Trudeau government to stage amendment), the Mulroney government finally  
enacted the Competition Act and Competition Tribunal Act in 1986. Largely following  
the Economic Council of Canada’s recommendations, Bill C-93 established the two-track  
approach and constituted the tribunal as the specialized adjudicative body, specifically  
intended to evaluate anti-competitive conduct through the lens of the statute’s economic  
objectives.110 Importantly, the Competition Act’s purposive clause describes the promotion 
of competition, not as an end in itself, but as a means of achieving broader economic 
objectives – in particular, the efficiency of the Canadian economy.111 
The new Competition Act bifurcated responsibilities: the Competition Bureau, under the 
Commissioner of Competition, is mandated to investigate and bring applications against 
anti-competitive behaviour; and, failing a negotiated resolution, the tribunal adjudicates any 
impugned conduct with independence and impartiality. 
In formulating the Competition Act, direct ministerial oversight of mergers (analogous to 
the FIRA regime) had been considered and rejected as a model for merger review, owing 
to the uncertainty and potential for abuse in such a direct approach.112 With the regime 
instead designed to safeguard the independence of both the commissioner and the tribunal, 
the drafters of the Competition Act aimed to ensure that decisions regarding challenges to 
mergers are made without political interference.113
Bestowing jurisdiction on the tribunal to assess the competitive effects of mergers, the 
1986 amendments replaced the CIA’s public detriment standard with the “reasonably likely 
to cause a substantial prevention or lessening of competition” (SPLC) test.114 Section 93 
of the Competition Act also sets out “an open-ended list of principled and economically 
literate factors to be used in assessing the likelihood of a so-called SPLC,”115 and section 
96 provides an explicit efficiency defence. As McFetridge observes, this established a “rule 
of reason analysis of mergers” with the tribunal directed to block those mergers where 
the SPLC resulting from the merger does not also result in efficiencies that offset these 
effects.116
110 
Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Competition Law Amendments: A Guide (Ottawa: Supply and Services 
Canada, 1985), 3:
   “ The adjudication of civil matters by a specialized Competition Tribunal will permit more sophisticated judgment, a 
better understanding of the business reality, a more flexible process, and, above all, timely decision-making, which is 
consistent with the policy underlying the [Competition Act].”
111 
Competition Act, s. 1, which reads:
   “ The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to promote the efficiency and 
adaptability of the Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets 
while at the same time recognizing the role of foreign competition in Canada, in order to ensure that small and 
medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy and in order to 
provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices.”
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Hunter, supra note 13, 60.
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114 
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Paul Collins and Michael Laskey, “Striking the Right Balance: 25 Years of Merger Review in Canada,” Canadian 
Competition Law Review 25, 2002, 419-421. 
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McFetridge, supra note 91, 543.
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Economic analysis has provided robust methodologies for the definition of geographic 
and product markets involved in mergers and the quantitative evaluation of competitive 
effects.117 Economic theory and analysis also notably shaped the tribunal’s application of 
the efficiency defence as exhibited by the Superior Propane case,118 where the tribunal was 
required to determine the appropriate approach for balancing the expected anti-competitive 
effects of the merger against the prospective efficiency gains. Notably, in the recent Tervita 
case,119 the Supreme Court discussed at length the commissioner’s evidentiary burden for 
quantifying anti-competitive effects,120 as well as affirmed the appropriateness of a forward-
looking “but for” analysis of future market conditions by the tribunal in evaluating the 
prevention of competition through a merger. Even with open-ended evaluative criteria, the 
tribunal has made appropriate and rigorous use of economic analysis to regulate mergers in 
accordance with the statute’s economic objectives.
Admittedly, the merger review process has produced relatively few decisions by the 
tribunal; since 1986, only six cases have been fully adjudicated.121 Arguably, this was 
an intention of the design that encourages settlement but provides a consistent and 
principles-based litigation process where the acquirer and the commissioner cannot reach 
117 
Ibid., 546-548.
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Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc., 2000 Comp. Trib. 15 [Superior Propane (Tribunal)], rev’d 
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in the balancing analysis for efficiency v. diminished competition, differential weights should be assigned to producer and 
consumer surplus or whether a “total surplus” standard should be employed.
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a negotiated settlement. Despite certain arguable procedural deficiencies,122 the tribunal 
provides recourse where a negotiated settlement cannot be agreed upon, thereby promoting 
accountability of the commissioner’s decisions.
REFORMING FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW 
Following from the example of competition law and the economic grounds for rejecting 
certain foreign investments, Canadian foreign investment review should be conceptually 
reformed to: 1) imbed economic efficiency as its paramount objective; and 2) entrench 
economic analysis as the exclusive basis for approval or rejection of proposed non-cultural 
foreign investments where national security is not implicated. 
Reversal of onus and economic criteria for net detriment
Substantively, the criteria for evaluating foreign investments under the current ICA are 
directly inherited from its highly restrictive predecessor statute, and, insofar as the ICA 
aims for economic efficiency and enhanced domestic welfare, the presumption against net 
benefit from those foreign investments beyond the review thresholds, as well as certain of 
the current factors for net benefit, are economically incoherent. Indeed, to the extent that 
the current review framework insulates domestic firms from competition from foreign 
entrants and diminishes the discipline from competitive product markets and markets for 
corporate control, the ICA counteracts the central objectives of Canadian competition 
policy.
Economic theory points to presumptive benefits from foreign acquisitions – as from 
acquisitions generally. Therefore, assuming that maximizing domestic welfare is the policy 
objective, grounds for barring foreign investments should be based in identifiable market 
failures or in empirically supported models for socially suboptimal behaviour by a foreign 
firm specifically. 
The legal test should follow the economics, with the government responsible for 
demonstrating net detriment according to concrete criteria. To impose the burden for 
showing net benefit on an acquirer increases the potential costs of an acquisition and 
122 
Several commentators argue that defects in the tribunal’s process have accentuated the tendency to settle rather than 
contest the commissioner’s determinations (Ibid., citing Hunter, supra note 13). Especially for time-sensitive mergers, 
commentators note several deterrents to challenging the commissioner’s determinations: the cost and delay of protracted 
proceedings (with contested merger proceedings lasting an average of 15 months); the transparency of tribunal proceedings 
(particularly for mergers, risking potential exposure of commercially sensitive information, such as business plans); the 
uncertainty of success given the paucity of precedents; and the lack of finality of tribunal decisions given the frequent 
appeals to the FCA (Calvin S. Goldman and Charles Layton, “Trials and Tribulations: A Quarter-Century of the 
Competition Tribunal,” Canadian Competition Law Review 25, 2012, 522, 526-528; and Edward Iacobucci and Michael 
Trebilcock, “Critical Reflections on the Institutional Design of Canadian Competition Policy,” Canadian Competition Law 
Review 24(1), 2011, 39. 
 
Observing evidence that 99 per cent of notified mergers are resolved without tribunal involvement, Goldman and Layton, 
528, (citing Trebilcock and Iacobucci, “Designing Competition Law Institutions,” World Competition 25, 2002, 361, 374) 
argue for amendments to tribunal procedure to expedite its proceedings, broaden its scope (providing for references 
on discrete issues and oversight of the information request process), increase its competence (by prescribing expert 
qualifications for lay members) and provide a more deferential standard for appellate review (by inserting a privative 
clause).
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makes the process susceptible to political capture by groups with private interests that are 
potentially at odds with domestic welfare generally.
With analogy to the SPLC standard for evaluating mergers, an appropriate economic 
standard for reviewing a foreign acquisition would be “reasonably likely to cause a 
detriment to domestic welfare.” Similar to the regime for merger review under competition 
law, this would compel the government to adduce an economically grounded theory of 
harm and evidence to support the likelihood of that harm if the proposed foreign acquisition 
of domestic assets were permitted. Such theory and evidence would be contestable by 
the parties to the transaction, who could also adduce expert testimony to challenge the 
government’s case – and its proposed undertakings – thereby ensuring the decision-maker’s 
accountability. 
Like the SPLC standard, a detriment to domestic welfare standard would provide an 
economically coherent benchmark that would be infused by economic theory and evidence 
in particular matters, allowing for expert debate about the features of the domestic markets 
implicated in a particular acquisition and the rational behaviour of the acquiring firm in 
allocating post-acquisition activities. Logically, establishing such a probable net reduction 
in domestic welfare would require demonstration that: 1) the assets will likely produce 
economic benefit for the Canadian economy in excess of their private value; and 2) relative 
to the counterfactual use of the assets, the foreign acquirer is likely to allocate the assets in 
a manner that deprives the Canadian economy of this value without any probable offsetting 
benefits.
Judicial/tribunal review and institutional independence
Procedurally, the current framework allows for highly discretionary decisions by the 
minister that are practically not subject to judicial or tribunal scrutiny. As such, the ICA 
risks politicized decision-making and the potential for regulatory capture by self-interested 
constituencies. 
For instance, even if an acquisition is expected to produce productivity and wage gains and 
a more efficient allocation of labour overall, certain labour groups would still rationally 
oppose the transaction since their members may not be the immediate recipients of the 
gains. Similarly, incumbent corporate managers may lobby against the transaction if it 
threatens them directly (i.e. replacement following a hostile acquisition) or indirectly 
through intensified product market competition. 
While the lack of disclosure around undertakings inhibits a full analysis, the observed 
undertaking creep flags the possibility that the minister’s discretion for rejection is 
increasingly being used to extract and redistribute part of the expected gains from certain 
acquisitions.
An independent review process with recourse to review by a specialized tribunal would 
mitigate the risk of regulatory capture. Again, the institutional design of competition law 
provides a model: proposed mergers are reviewed by a politically independent Competition 
Bureau and its decisions may be challenged before the Competition Tribunal (excepting, as 
noted above, that present procedural obstacles exist for the tribunal’s efficacy in contested 
mergers).
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Rationale for reform
While the high rate of approvals under the ICA might indicate the lack of deterrent to FDI, 
this neglects the likelihood of self-selection out of the review process (i.e. either withdrawal 
of the proposal or the decision not to embark on an acquisition). While Canada’s FDI/GDP 
share may seem adequate relative to peer economies, the appropriate comparison is the 
less restrictive counterfactual (i.e. how much FDI would Canada attract absent the ICA’s 
restrictive elements). Moreover, as has long been a theme in competition policy, structural 
features (for instance, the degree of concentration in a market) may be inadequate proxies 
for the competitive intensity of the given market. 
The lack of transparency and recourse to impartial, principles-based adjudication would 
create uncertainty for any foreign investor considering an acquisition. Investors have no 
alternative but to withdraw in the face of unreasonable requests for undertakings by the 
minister. To the extent that such requests for undertakings crowd out marginal investments, 
the review process may constitute a barrier to foreign entrants and place a damper on 
domestic competition.
Despite certain procedural deficiencies, the presumptions, process and institutions of 
merger review under Canadian competition law provide a workable model for the reform 
of foreign investment review. As indicated by the purposive clause in the Competition 
Act, competition is not an end in itself, but rather a means of ensuring the efficiency and 
adaptability of the Canadian economy. 
Similarly, attracting foreign direct investment should not be conceived as an end in itself, 
but rather as a means of promoting economic efficiency through competitive product 
markets and markets for corporate control. Indeed, given the ideal overlap of objectives (i.e. 
enhancing domestic productivity) and centrality of economic analysis, a greater integration 
with Canada’s framework for competition policy would improve the substantive coherence 
and procedural consistency of foreign investment review.
To this end, the ICA should be reformed to: 1) reverse the presumption against foreign 
investments, moving to a net detriment standard for rejections; 2) establish economically 
grounded evaluative criteria, to be interpreted based on economic efficiency and domestic 
welfare objectives; and 3) create procedures for adjudicating decisions under the ICA by an 
independent and impartial, expert tribunal. Adopting the Competition Tribunal as the venue 
for disputes under such a reformed ICA would be justified by the overlapping economic 
issues and evidence that might arise under both competition law and foreign investment 
review.123 
Drawing on the evolution and conceptual underpinnings of Canadian competition policy, 
this paper has sought to plot an agenda for the modernization of foreign investment review 
and, even more ambitiously, points to the potential integration of the frameworks around 
coherent economic principles.
123 
Assigning foreign investment review to the tribunal would leverage the tribunal’s experience with applying economic 
analysis within legal disputes. This would have the collateral benefit of increasing the tribunal’s potential workload (further 
justifying the appointment of expert lay panel members) and available jurisprudence.
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